Pahalgam Terror Attack: Tearing Up Treaties May Backfire On Pakistan, Tilt Strategic Advantage Towards India

In the aftermath of the cold-blooded massacre of tourists in Pahalgam by terrorists owing allegiance to a Lashkar-e-Toiba affiliate, both India and Pakistan targeted long-standing treaties which govern river flows and the effective border between the two countries.

This “tearing up of treaties” went down well with nationalists on either side and added to the war rhetoric. While politicians in Pakistan threatened a “river of blood” if the water flowing through the Indus River was impeded, Indian leaders spoke of ensuring that “not even a drop” of water reached Pakistan.

However, despite the bravado, the reality is far more complex. Geography and topography dictate how a river flows; human intervention to store part of this water also depends on geographical realities more than engineering marvels.

The Indus Water Treaty, signed by both countries in 1960 under the aegis of the World Bank, despite its many shortcomings, at least recognised geographical realities and awarded the three western rivers, which flow into the main Indus—Chenab, Jhelum, and the Indus itself—to Pakistan.

On the Indian side, these rivers travel through narrow gorges and valleys where attempts to divert or store most of the water can lead to catastrophic consequences, which could include flooding the entire Kashmir Valley, while being unable to stop the flow of the rivers as they rush downstream.

India was given the three eastern rivers, Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej, which flow through the flat plains of (Indian) Punjab. Water reservoirs and hydel projects can be set up more easily on these rivers. But one has to remember that Punjab is a densely populated state, and giving up land for any project, even in national interests, will be a major political issue, which could well unsettle the BJP’s main ally—the Akali Dal.

Pertinently, we also need to realise that the largest of these three “Indian” rivers, Sutlej, originates in Rakastal Lake in Tibet, and any attempt to play with its hydrography could tempt the Chinese to do the same upstream. Drawing more water through canals and flow-of-the-river hydel projects is the most that India can realistically attempt to achieve, and even these can take between five-to-a-dozen years to complete.

However, a trailer of what can happen was enacted last week, when water was released from the small Uri dam, a run-of-the-river hydro project on the Chenab River. Engineers had to release the surging water, as otherwise the dam, swollen by spring snowmelt from the Himalayan glaciers, could have done far more damage.

Usually, such releases are notified, and hydrological data is shared between neighbours to help evacuate civilians and cattle herds living near river embankments. However, with the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, no information was given to Pakistan. The Chenab flooding, this time round, came unannounced.

Far worse can occur in times ahead if the simplest of tasks, sharing of water data, is given up, and this can well see Pakistan raising the bogey of “water wars” in the years ahead unless the IWT in its current form or a more reformed water pact comes into play. Reforms are, of course, needed because the real threat to Pakistan and India is not a military conflict but the fast shrinking of the Himalayas.

Recent research indicates that Himalayan glaciers, from where our rivers rise, have lost about 40 per cent of their area since the peak of the Little Ice Age, which occurred between 400 to 700 years ago. Scientists also record that the process of ice melt in the region has accelerated over the last few decades due to rising global temperatures and greenhouse gas emissions. Photographs of Himalayan peaks taken in the 1950s compared to those taken now dramatically reveal how far the snow cap on each peak has receded.

Both countries have to plan for lower water availability, accept reduced water withdrawal rights for farming, and re-plan their crop choices, and this can only happen if they negotiate a fresh Indus Water Treaty.

If they fail to do so, both India’s Doab and Pakistan’s Indus basin in the Punjab-Sindh region risk turning into a desert, with the population suffering a fate similar to that of the people who lived in Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro many millennia ago.

The threat by Islamabad to tear up the 1972 Shimla agreement can have far more serious and disastrous consequences for Pakistan than for India. One can understand that the signing of a treaty acknowledging defeat in 1971 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto carries the stigma of trauma and shame that a defeated nation often has to bear.

However, this treaty, drawn up by stalwarts like PN Haksar, an Indian diplomat and strategist who did not want Pakistan to turn into a resentful state akin to post-WWI Germany, gave Pakistan several guarantees. Firstly, it turned the ceasefire line in Kashmir into a de facto border called the Line of Control, which meant that India, the militarily stronger power, would not in the normal course try to cross it.

Secondly, it returned the approximately 13,000 square km of land in the plains, (mostly in Sindh’s Tharparkar district) which India had occupied during the 1971 war, recognising that the existing border drawn by Sir Cyril Radcliffe would continue to be honoured.

Tearing up this treaty which Bhutto and Mrs Indira Gandhi signed will not undo history, but it could, in years to come, give India an excuse to cross the LoC in pursuit of annexing strategic border areas. There are many who dream of reclaiming Gilgit and Skardu, lost by the Maharaja of Kashmir due to revolts organised by a British army officer in his employ who seemed to favour Jinnah over his overlord, and to an unprovoked attack by Pakistani troops, respectively.

The abrogation of the Shimla treaty could also tempt nationalists to dream of bringing the entire Thar desert with its untapped mineral and oil wealth under Indian control. Tharparkar is believed to have one of the world’s largest lignite reserves.

Instead of such knee-jerk reactions, Islamabad perhaps needs to take a 360-degree perspective of its relations with its nearest neighbour and potentially largest trading partner and go in for an overhaul of both its strategic and foreign policy goals.

Needless to say, once the question of continued terror attacks against India is tackled, New Delhi too needs to carry out a similar exercise, as geography cannot be changed, and one has to ultimately learn to live with one’s neighbours.

The writer is former head of PTI’s eastern region network.